CACI No. 418. Presumption of Negligence per se

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)

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418 . Presumption of Negligence per se

[ Insert citation to statute, r egulation, or or dinance ] states:

If [ name of plaintiff/defendant ] proves

1. That [ name of defendant/plaintiff ] violated this law and

2. That the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the

then you must find that [ name of defendant/plaintiff ] was negligent [unless

you also find that the violation was excused].

If you find that [ name of defendant/plaintiff ] did not violate this law or

that the violation was not a substantial factor in bringing about the

harm [or if you find the violation was excused], then you must still

decide whether [ name of defendant/plaintiff ] was negligent in light of the

other instructions.

New September 2003; Revised December 2005, June 201 1, November 2020

Directions for Use

This jury instruction addresses the establishment of the two factual elements

underlying the presumption of negligence. If they are not established, then a finding

of negligence cannot be based on the alleged statutory violation. However ,

negligence can still be proven by other means. (See Nunneley v . Edgar Hotel (1950)

36 Cal.2d 493, 500-501 [225 P .2d 497].)

If a rebuttal is of fered on the ground that the violation was excused, then the

bracketed portion in the second and last paragraphs should be read. For an

instruction on excuse, see CACI No. 420, Negligence per se: Rebuttal of the

Pr esumption of Negligence - V iolation Excused.

If the statute is lengthy , the judge may want to read it at the end of this instruction

instead of at the beginning. The instruction would then need to be revised, to tell

the jury that they will be hearing the statute at the end.

Rebuttal of the presumption of negligence is addressed in the instructions that

follow (see CACI Nos. 420 and 421).

Sources and Authority

• Negligence per se. Evidence Code section 669.

• “Although compliance with the law does not prove the absence of negligence,

violation of the law does raise a presumption that the violator was negligent.

This is called negligence per se.” ( Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v . W estern Farm

Service, Inc . (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1526 [1 19 Cal.Rptr .3d 529]; see also

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Cal. Law Revision Com. com. to Evid. Code, § 669.)

• “ ‘The negligence per se doctrine is codified in Evidence Code section 669,

subdivision (a), under which negligence is presumed if the plaintif f establishes

four elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2)

the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the

death or injury resulted from an occurrence the nature of which the statute,

ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suf fering

the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons

for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.’ ‘The

burden is on the proponent of a negligence per se instruction to demonstrate that

these elements are met.’ ” ( T aulbee v . EJ Distribution Corp . (2019) 35

Cal.App.5th 590, 596 [247 Cal.Rptr .3d 538], internal citations omitted.)

• “The first two elements are normally questions for the trier of fact and the last

two are determined by the trial court as a matter of law . That is, the trial court

decides whether a statute or regulation defines the standard of care in a

particular case.” ( Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p.

1526, internal citations omitted; see also Cal. Law Revision Com. com. to Evid.

• “[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates

an evidentiary presumption that af fects the standard of care in a cause of action

for negligence.” ( T urner v . Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534 [238

Cal.Rptr .3d 528].)

• “Under the doctrine of negligence per se, the plaintif f ‘borrows’ statutes to prove

duty of care and standard of care. [Citation.] The plainti ff still has the burden of

proving causation.” ( David v . Hernandez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 578, 584 [172

Cal.Rptr .3d 204].)

• “Where a statute establishes a party’ s duty , ‘ “proof of the [party’ s] violation of a

statutory standard of conduct raises a presumption of negligence that may be

rebutted only by evidence establishing a justification or excuse for the statutory

violation.” ’ This rule, generally known as the doctrine of negligence per se,

means that where the court has adopted the conduct prescribed by statute as the

standard of care for a reasonable person, a violation of the statute is presumed to

be negligence.” ( Spriesterbach v . Holland (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 255, 263 [155

Cal.Rptr .3d 306], internal citation omitted.)

• “[I]n negligence per se actions, the plaintif f must produce evidence of a violation

of a statute and a substantial probability that the plaintif f’ s injury was caused by

the violation of the statute before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to

prove the violation of the statute did not cause the plaintif f’ s injury .” ( T oste v .

CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 371 [199 Cal.Rptr .3d

• “ ‘The significance of a statute in a civil suit for negligence lies in its

formulation of a standard of conduct that the court adopts in the determination

of such liability . The decision as to what the civil standard should be still rests

NEGLIGENCE CACI No. 418

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with the court, and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a police

regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability

only because the court accepts it. In the absence of such a standard the case goes

to the jury , which must determine whether the defendant has acted as a

reasonably prudent man would act in similar circumstances. The jury then has

the burden of deciding not only what the facts are but what the unformulated

standard is of reasonable conduct. When a legislative body has generalized a

standard from the experience of the community and prohibits conduct that is

likely to cause harm, the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them

[citations], except where they would serve to impose liability without fault.’ ”

( Ramir ez v . Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 547 [25 Cal.Rptr .2d 97, 863 P .2d

167].), internal citations omitted.)

• “There is no doubt in this state that a federal statute or regulation may be

adopted as a standard of care.” ( DiRosa v . Showa Denko K. K. (1996) 44

Cal.App.4th 799, 808 [52 Cal.Rptr .2d 128].)

• “[T]he courts and the Legislature may create a negligence duty of care, but an

administrative agency cannot independently impose a duty of care if that

authority has not been properly delegated to the agency by the Legislature.”

( Cal. Serv . Station Etc. Ass’n v . Am. Home Assur . Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th

1 166, 1 175 [73 Cal.Rptr .2d 182].)

• “In combination, the [1999] language and the deletion [to Lab. Code, § 6304.5]

indicate that henceforth, Cal-OSHA provisions are to be treated like any other

statute or regulation and may be admitted to establish a standard or duty of care

in all negligence and wrongful death actions, including third party actions.”

( Elsner v . Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 928 [22 Cal.Rptr .3d 530, 102 P .3d

• “While courts have applied negligence per se to building code violations, it has

only been applied in limited situations.” ( Jones v . A wad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th

1200, 1212 [252 Cal.Rptr .3d 596].)

Secondary Sources

6 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) T orts, §§ 1002-1028

Haning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury , Ch. 2(II)-H, Negligence

Pr edicated On Statutory V iolation ( “Negligence Per Se” ), ¶ 2:1845 (The Rutter

W egner et al., California Practice Guide: Civil T rials & Evidence, Ch. 8G-C,

Pr ocedural Considerations - Pr esumptions , ¶ 8:3604 (The Rutter Group)

California T ort Guide (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed.) §§ 1.28-1.31

1 Levy et al., California T orts, Ch. 3, Proof of Negligence , §§ 3.10, 3.13 (Matthew

4 California Trial Guide, Unit 90, Closing Argument , §§ 90.88, 90.89 (Matthew

California Products Liability Actions, Ch. 7, Pr oof , § 7.04 (Matthew Bender)

CACI No. 418 NEGLIGENCE

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33 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 380, Negligence , § 380.50

(Matthew Bender)

16 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 165, Negligence , §§ 165.70, 165.80,

165.81 (Matthew Bender)

NEGLIGENCE CACI No. 418

Page last reviewed May 2024

Kathryn Robb

Kathryn Robb, National Director of the Children’s Justice Campaign at Enough Abuse, discusses Vice President Kamala Harris’s unusual mention of child sexual abuse during her Democratic National Convention speech and its broader implications for addressing this issue in America.

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